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In Ellis’s scandalous end-of-the-eighties novel American Psycho, the tale of 
Patrick Bateman—a Wall Street yuppie who claims to be a part-time psychopath—
the body is first conceived of as a visible surface which must conform to the norms of 
the yuppies’ etiquette. I use the word “etiquette,” which Patrick uses (231) and which 
I oppose to the word “ethics” which suggests moral depth, to stretch how superficial 
the yuppie’s concerns are and to underline, notably, that the yuppie’s sense of self is 
limited to his social self, his public appearance, his self-image, which I relate to D. W. 
Winnicott’s “false self.”1 Ellis’s yuppies abide by the gospel words of Donald Trump 
(109-10), TV hosts David Letterman (395) and fictitious Patti Winters (29), GQ (31), 
New York magazine and the Financial Times (108), and that authoritative guide to 
good restaurants, “the trusty Mr. Zagat” (32). These texts decide not only of how the 
yuppie must act and what he should wear over his body, but also of what he can put 
into his body and what he can put his body into. 
 René Alladaye has noted “this domination of surfaces,” “identities blurring, so 
that you end up not knowing who’s who” in the novel (93, my translation) The same 
words are more or less used to introduce different characters: desirable women are 
described as “big tits, blonde, great ass, high heels” (30); cool yuppie acquaintances 
are described as being tan and fit and wearing suits, cotton shirts and silk ties (87). 
The slight variations, like the almost imperceptible differences between Patrick’s 
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friends’ business cards (44-5), point at the impossibility to perfectly conform to the 
etiquette, something which often fills Patrick with “nameless dread” (264), an 
expression he uses eight times.2 The etiquette clearly represents, then, a desire- and 
anguish-producing law3 which fashions matter into desirable or abject bodies, 
making these bodies, as Judith Butler would have it, matter. 
For the yuppies of American Psycho, one’s identity is not so much represented by 
one’s appearance as it is one’s appearance. After “one night of binging,” Patrick 
concludes: “All it comes down to is this: I feel like shit but look great.” (106) 
Consequently, the point of keeping fit and working out is not to feel good but to look 
good (236), and Patrick takes the idea of sculpting his body very literally, comparing 
his “chest” to “steel” and his “pectorals” to “granite” (370). Completely reified, the 
body is placed on par with the other elements that make up one’s appearance, for 
instance a girl’s “big tits” and “high heels.” These signs, which are required to certify 
someone’s health and desirability, are made readable thanks to the reading grids 
provided by yuppie Scripture. 
 My argument, here, is based on an idea suggested by Lacan in Séminaire XX : 
Encore on the relation between sign and signifier: 
 
Je veux terminer en montrant par où le signe se 
différencie du signifiant. 
[...] Le signe n’est donc pas le signe de quelque chose, 
mais d’un effet qui est ce qui se suppose en tant que tel 
d’un fonctionnement du signifiant. (48) 
 
[…] c’est bien d’une subordination du signe au regard du 
signifiant qu’il s’agit dans tout ce que j’ai avancé. (93) 
 
In Bodies That Matter Judith Butler takes up Lacan’s idea and explicitly relates it to the 
body and to the notion of performativity. 
 
The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or 
signified as prior. This signification produces as an effect of 
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its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and 
simultaneously claims to discover as that which precedes 
its own action. If the body signified as prior to 
signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic 
or representational status of language, which claims that 
signs follow bodies as their necessary mirrors, is not 
mimetic at all. On the contrary, it is productive, 
constitutive, one might even argue performative, inasmuch 
as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that 
it then claims to find prior to any and all signification. (30) 
 
What I want to show is that there is a confusion in the way the yuppie-psychopath 
perceive bodies and, more generally, matter. In short, the body is perceived as a sign 
of something, as proof of the validity of the etiquette, when it is actually an effect of 
the signifier, i.e. of the etiquette that has fashioned it. For example, a girl’s “big tits” 
are seen by the yuppie as a sign of her desirability, but they are constituted as such 
by the etiquette. 
 What makes American Psycho so interesting is the extremes to which Ellis 
carries the thesis that the law fashions the subject: in the end, the yuppies’ obsession 
with bodies, image and images, appearances and signs only emphasizes the 
predominance of signifiers, discourse and the symbolic order which constitute the 
former as meaningful in postmodern culture. In short, the novel’s excess makes the 
invisible workings of what Foucault called “power” excessively visible in its 
representation of 80s New York, by condensing the yuppie and the serial killer into a 
pregnant metaphor of consumer society.4 Indeed, after showing how the yuppie 
fashions his body according to the etiquette, thus fashioning himself, I will go on to 
argue that Patrick’s second identity is intended to be a reaction against the 
predominance of surface in the yuppie world. “Being a psychopath” would represent 
a quest not only for depth, but more specifically for an original sign that would make 
things, including the subject, matter, so to speak. That Patrick carries this quest out 
on the female body will be seen as symptomatic of the paradox underlined by Luce 
Irigaray, that the female body and female sexuality have always been seen as un-
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representable, inexpressible, as a gap or a lack, so that their being represented in 
phallic terms is a means of filling the gap of absence of signification. Irigaray argues, 
through the example of Freud, that, in the end, the feminine is always conceived of in 
masculine terms: “Un homme moins la possibilité de se (re)présenter comme homme 
= une femme normale.” (26-7) She describes woman as man’s double, as “raw 
material”: “[c]et inconnaissable et qui ne possède pas l’existence en soi” (201), “[la 
femme] serait le support, l’espace d’inscription, des représentants de l’inconscient  
‘masculin’.” (138) Matter, which has always been associated to the feminine (246-7), 
is thus the surface onto which the phallocentric symbolic order has inscribed 
meaning. I will argue that the relation between the penis and the phallus stands as a 
paradigmatic example of this confusion between sign and signifier, the phallus, if “it 
is not the penis” (83), representing nevertheless, as Butler argues, “an idealization of 
a body part” (73). 
 Patrick’s quest to go beyond the surface is thus an essentialist one, as it is the 
quest for a matter that would originally signify prior to the symbolic order. I suggest 
it is a quest for what Clément Rosset calls an “idea of nature,” i.e. the idea that there 
remains something once one has set aside the effects of artifice and chance.5 But what 
the psychopath’s practices will ultimately reveal is the absence of revelation, of 
signification, the body showing itself to be matter and nothing but matter, an 
instance of what Rosset calls the “anti-nature,” “essentially a denial of nature and a 
universal assertion of chance” (55, my translation), that is to say matter which defies 
the laws of nature and reveals their artificiality, hence underlining the artificiality of 
what Foucault would call the techniques and discourses the serial killer, like the 
etiquette, subjects it to. 
 In the second chapter, “Morning,” Patrick Bateman represents his yuppie self 
as an actor in a TV commercial for shaving products. 
 
Once out of the shower and toweled dry I put the Ralph 
Lauren boxers back on and before applying the Mousse A 
Raser, a shaving cream by Pour Hommes, I press a hot 
towel against my face for two minutes to soften abrasive 
beard hair. Then I always slather on a moisturizer (to my 
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taste, Clinique) and let it soak in for a minute. You can 
rinse it off or keep it on and apply a shaving cream over 
it—preferably with a brush, which softens the beard as it 
lifts the whiskers—which I’ve found makes removing the 
hair easier. It also helps prevent water from evaporating 
and reduces friction between your skin and the blade. 
Always wet the razor with warm water before shaving 
and shave in the direction the beard grows, pressing 
gently on the skin. Leave the sideburns and chin for last, 
since these whiskers are tougher and need more time to 
soften. [...] One should use an alcohol-free antibacterial 
toner with a water-moistened cotton ball to normalize the 
skin. (27) 
 
What is at stake in this excerpt is the idea that Patrick’s self-image is textually-
constructed. Whether consciously or not, the narrator clearly attempts to transpose 
one medium to another, film to text, with these “close-ups” of Patrick’s body hair 
and skin. But their being placed between dashes or in apposition underlines their 
very textuality and thus the impossibility of perfectly conforming to scripture. These 
“close-ups” grotesquely emphasize Patrick’s obsession with clearing away his body 
to make it into a perfect surface, as well as the very impossibility of this enterprise. 
The narrator becomes a voice-over in the process of fashioning the character into an 
actor, hence losing authority over his own text by becoming an element of the 
commercial. Patrick is, then, reified by the discourse he cites as character and 
narrator. The speaking “I” progressively makes way to a disengaged, impersonal 
voice, while the character’s personal experience (“I’ve found”) merges with a 
protocol that can work for anyone (or at least for any yuppie); the words of advice of 
the “I” become imperatives issuing from an unidentified enunciator while the 
disengaged pronoun “one“ significantly appears in the sentence dealing with how to 
“normalize the skin.” If subjectivity is first put in brackets, it is then entirely 
evacuated as it gives way completely to the etiquette discourse. In any case, this 
merely brings to light the process of subjection as the etiquette was speaking through 
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the “I” to start with. 
 Interestingly enough, this discourse which dictates a recipe for fashioning the 
body does so in the name of the body: each stage of this protocol aims at facilitating 
the process of purifying the bodily surface, but paradoxically, the protocol can also 
be harmful. This excerpt very literally suggests that consumer society fashions bodies 
all the while founding its normative discourse in a corporeal truth which precedes it, 
a process which is, in this example, authorized by the commercial discourse, for the 
voice-over attempts to impose the idea that the protocol is born from experience, and 
thus self-discovery. What makes the etiquette, and the consumer society for which it 
is a metaphor, so powerful is that, all in all, the subject willingly applies and recites 
these discourses which he has in front of his very eyes, remaining completely blind, 
however, to the fact that his body cannot be the proof of the truth and of the validity 
of the etiquette since his very words are constructing this matter that is his body into 
an effect of discourse. This type of very visible power might be more dangerous than 
the invisible “regimes of power” Michel Foucault analyzed.   
 The same process informs the construction of the body of the other as a 
potentially “unhealthy” body. I have argued in L’Imagination malsaine that, for 
Ellis’s yuppies, the other is seen as a “foreign body,” and women appear particularly 
“unhealthy” because they can sexually transmit diseases—the yuppies never worry 
about passing diseases on to others (34). The relationship between the unhealthy 
nature of the female body and the derivative of the phallocentric law Patrick has 
interiorised is clearly illustrated in the serial killer’s horrific practises, especially in 
one of the novel’s most disturbing passages, the “Girl” chapter, where Patrick 
perverts the “normal” (read, heterosexual) coupling between a man and a woman by 
replacing the man’s penis by a rat, an animal which is contiguously related to disease 
and vampirism.6
 
The rat hurls itself against the glass cage as I move it from 
the kitchen into the living room. It refused to eat what 
was left of the other rat I had bought it to play with last 
week, that now lies dead, rotting in a corner of the cage. 
(For the last five days I’ve purposefully starved it.) I set 
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the glass cage down next to the girl and maybe because of 
the scent of the cheese the rat seems to go insane, first 
running in circles, mewling, then trying to heave its body, 
weak with hunger, over the side of the cage. The rat 
doesn’t need any prodding and the bent coat hanger I was 
going to use remains untouched by my side and with the 
girl still unconscious, the thing moves effortlessly on 
newfound energy, racing up the tube until half of its body 
disappears, and then after a minute—its body shaking 
while it feeds—all of it vanishes, except for the tail, and I 
yank the Habitrail tube out of the girl, trapping the 
rodent. Soon even the tail disappears. The noises the girl 
is making are, for the most part, incomprehensible. (328-9) 
 
With this horrible experiment, mad scientist Patrick Bateman seems to want to 
demonstrate that female sexuality, metonymically represented by an anonymous 
society woman who inverted traditional gender roles by “com[ing] on to [him], 
hard” (327), is by nature unhealthy. Significantly, Patrick, who imitates naturalist 
discourse by observing and attempting to explain the rat’s behavior—the structure of 
the sentence underlines that the hypothesis (“maybe because of the scent of the 
cheese”) precedes the empiric observation of the body—insists on the fact that the rat 
penetrates the woman without his intervention, as if the rat were “naturally” 
attracted to the woman, when it is actually Patrick who has placed the cage next to 
the woman and “purposefully starved” the rat, a piece of information whose weight 
is reduced by its being parenthetically intimated. By inserting a Habitrail tube, 
Patrick constitutes the woman’s body into a home for a domestic rodent, in other 
words, into a cage for the unhealthy.  
 Patrick is also responsible for penetrating/endowing this anonymous woman 
with an unhealthy penis substitute, the rat becoming a metaphor for the unhealthy 
male penis, which is paradoxical since for the yuppies, the unhealthy is exclusively 
other and primarily female. Indeed, Patrick seems incapable of conceiving of a 
sexuality other than one based on the male model of penetration, and this even if he 
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considers lesbianism as “totally disease-free” (287). 
 Not only does this scene underline that the yuppie endows a powerful woman 
with an unhealthy penis, but more generally, it also imparts that he conceives female 
sexuality in terms of penis envy and female power as a derivative of male power—
the parallel between power and sexuality is established through the adjective “hard” 
and the pun on “came.” (327) Obviously, as the rat penetrates and withdraws from 
the woman’s body, it stands for a grotesque parody of sexual intercourse, but this act 
also perversely mimics the conception of a male child. The rat, with its tail “as long 
as a pencil and twice as thick” (309) recalls the little boy who, in Irigaray’s reading of 
Freud, represents “a substitute of the penis, desired by the woman as such and 
nothing more”7 (117, my translation). The rat represents thus both an unhealthy 
penis and the child of an artificial insemination with Patrick in the part of the 
castrating father in spite of himself: it is only after he has “use[d] a chain saw” to “cut 
the girl in two” that he “notice[s] where the chain saw took off about half of [the 
rat’s] tail” (329), so that dismembering the unrepresentable and abject female body 
means dismembering the substitute for the penis used to represent it. 
 What is at stake here is, then, the meaning ascribed to the female body. 
Patrick’s experiment aims at making the female organs and orgasm visible with the 
rat’s tail sticking out and “its body shaking while it feeds.” The reversal instigated by 
Patrick is, from his point of view, reassuring because it gives meaning to the female 
body by reinstating the primacy of the phallus thanks to a penis substitute. But 
Patrick’s “technique” turns against him as a new reversal reinstates the unreadable 
female genitalia. The long sentence which describes Patrick’s reversal is brutally cut 
off by two sentences without secondary clauses: the female body loses all (phallic) 
meaning while the (penis) tail disappears, as does the “incomprehensible” female 
discourse which drowns out the (death) orgasm of the woman in mystery. Later, the 
woman’s dead body will seemingly subvert Patrick’s experiment by suggesting 
ingestion rather than penetration: “Her vagina has discharged a brownish syrupy 
fluid that smells like a sick animal, as if that rat had been forced back up in there, had 
been digested or something.” (344, my emphasis) The alliteration in [d] relates the 
female orgasm (again represented in masculine terms) to assimilation, which 
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suggests that what, for the yuppie, is horrifying about the female body, is its capacity 
to transform the foreign body which penetrates it. The focus on ingestion, notably 
through the comparison to “syrup,” also suggests, on Patrick’s part, a fantasy of a 
return to a pre-oedipal state prior to discourse, a state Patrick is cut off from by the 
discourses he is subjected to. This dead female body, which nevertheless seems to 
live on, represents, here, the contingency of matter deconstructing the dominant 
discourses and techniques which have fashioned it, a contingency Patrick cannot not 
put into words. 
Not only is the novel’s violence an “act in language,” as Julian Murphet suggests 
(45), but it is from the start discursive insofar as it appears as a consequence of the 
yuppie’s subjection to discourses which fashion his desire and which he recites. I 
disagree, then, with Julian Murphet when he suggests that the narrator reaches a sort 
of “literary flair” in the violent passages (45). Patrick’s “compulsive” prose is always 
literal and, unlike Ellis’s text, not literary. The most horrible act of torture in the 
novel is also the scene which best underlines the horrific consequences of absolute 
subjection to the law: it is an artifice (an imitation of Nazi practices, if one believes 
Ellis who repeatedly insists on the fact that he did not invent anything in the horror 
scenes) effected by a subject who is trying to found his truth in the corporeal (matter 
having always been considered in feminine terms, according to Irigaray) to which he 
gives a meaning (phallus) by representing the unhealthy nature of the other in 
masculine terms (penis). It is in this sense that I see the couple penis/phallus as 
offering a paradigmatic example of the confusion the subject makes between the sign 
and the signifier. 
 In any case, Patrick’s phallocenteredness explains why he subjects his victims 
to forms of torture that can be likened to castration. When he blinds a homeless man, 
he compares the pierced eye to an egg, relating castration to an emptying of a body-
productive female body: “His eye, burst open, hangs out of its socket and runs down 
his face and he keeps blinking which causes what’s left of it inside the wound to 
pour out like red, veiny egg yolk.” (131) Not only is the egg, unlike the woman’s 
womb, visible, but its yolk is here made visible and is also eatable. This, of course, 
can be related to what I said above concerning Patrick’s pre-oedipal fantasy. In 
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another scene, Patrick tears out the tongue of Bethany, “a girl [he] dated at Harvard 
and who [he] was subsequently dumped by” (211), and who repeatedly puts him 
down verbally. 
 
She tries to cry out again but she’s losing consciousness 
and she’s capable of only a weak moan. I take advantage 
of her helpless state and, removing my gloves, force her 
mouth open and with the scissors cut out her tongue, 
which I pull easily from her mouth and hold in the palm 
of my hand, warm and still bleeding, seeming so much 
smaller than in her mouth, and I throw it against the wall, 
where it sticks for a moment, leaving a stain, before 
falling to the floor with a tiny wet slap. Blood gushes out 
of her mouth and I have to hold her head up so she won’t 
choke. Then I fuck her in the mouth, and after I’ve 
ejaculated and pulled out, I Mace her some more. (246) 
 
Once it is no longer in its place in the woman’s mouth, the tongue, which, for Patrick, 
seemed to represent a sign of this woman’s discursive power, becomes momentarily 
the sign of her impotence: Bethany will not be able to call out for help, nor can she 
use her tongue as a weapon anymore. Only once taken out of its context, Patrick 
rejects this abject piece of flesh which temporarily defies the laws of nature by 
sticking to the wall before falling to the ground. The “stain” on the wall is a sign of 
nothing more than the passing of this tongue which has landed there because of 
Patrick’s quest for meaning. The tongue is, then, no longer a sign of the woman’s 
discursive power; it is, for an instant, a body which signifies nothing, a body which 
does not matter. As the etiquette the yuppies abide by limits itself to a conception of 
the body as a surface, the inside of the body is meaningful to Patrick. While the latter 
has described with naturalist rigor the protocol to follow, the tongue is merely a 
matter which represents, if it be possible, Rosset’s “anti-nature.” And it is probably to 
fill this lack of meaning, this matter which does not matter, that Patrick immediately 
performs a perverted version of his “natural” reproductive function. Patrick’s 
obsession with “fuck[ing]” the mouths of his female victims is an extremely literal 
representation of the male subject’s desire to mark the unrepresentable feminine lack 
which he represents anyway in masculine terms. Ironically, Patrick’s act can hardly 
be deemed “natural” in relation to the phallocentric law, fellatio with a dead body 
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being a non-reproductive a form of sexuality. Moreover, Patrick’s own practices too 
are artificial, as the verb Mace, derived from a brand name, suggests. Patrick’s 
practices are merely the repetition of practices he has learned by watching 
pornographic and horror films and by reading real-life biographies of serial killers 
(92). Even more ironic, perhaps, the horror and animality associated to feminine lack 
persists even when the castrating tongue has been extracted: “the mouth opens and 
not even screams come out anymore, just horrible, guttural, animal-like noises, 
sometimes interrupted by retching sounds.” (246) 
 As the body is considered only in terms of surface, it will come as no surprise 
that everything which can penetrate it will be seen as a disturbing foreign body. This 
explains why the latter is always described in phallic terms: it is the only way for the 
yuppie to represent and apprehend the other’s power and especially to make the non-
representable visible to better neutralize it, to punish it and protect oneself from it by 
eliminating specific body parts. In an article on Glamorama, Françoise Buisson 
compares Ellis’s style to John Barth’s “literature of exhaustion” and talks of 
“literature of evisceration.” (91, my translation) It is indeed possible to speak of 
exhaustion at a diegetic level (the exhaustion of wanting to conform to norms) and at 
the level of the reader’s response (the exhaustion of reading such a repetitive text). 
Evisceration suggests an attempt to empty the text of its signifiers as the psychopath 
empties the body of its blood. Indeed, for Patrick, any part of the other’s body—
blood (290), intestines (344)—is potentially unhealthy, so that, in the end, he has no 
choice but to eliminate the whole body: the psychopath puts a victim’s “head […] in 
a tin pot on the stove in an attempt to boil any remaining flesh [he] forgot to shave 
off” (345), in the same manner as the yuppie tried to shave himself perfectly in order 
to conform to the standards of etiquette. As his practices increase in frequency and 
violence, Patrick seems to be pursuing a sort of quest for an original sign which 
would justify the etiquette his identity is founded on. But even when he turns the 
body upside-down—as with Tiffani who, like Kafka’s Gregor Samsa, lays “like a 
roach on her back” (305)—or inside-out, the body reveals no founding “idea of 
nature.” When he disembowels the sharpei, “drag[ging] itself around in a circle, its 
tail wagging, squealing” (165), the living-dead animal, which condenses the notions 
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of devouring and phallocentric sexual representations8, becomes, like bitchy 
Bethany’s tongue or the anonymous woman’s vagina, a body which defies the laws 
of nature. What I have been calling the “anti-nature” is, then, nothing more than a 
sign of itself, or rather it isn’t a sign at all, except if the subject re-fashions it, making 
it signify, which is, in the end, what Patrick seems to do with the head of one of his 
victims: 
 
My apartment reeks of rotten fruit, though actually the 
smell is caused by what I scooped out of Christie’s head 
and poured into a Marco glass bowl that sits on a counter 
near the entranceway. The head itself lies covered with 
brain pulp, hollow and eyeless, in the corner of the living 
room beneath the piano and I plan to use it as a jack-o’-
lantern on Halloween. (300-1) 
 
Emptied out, the prostitute’s head recalls the poster of John Carpenter’s Halloween 
(1978) where a psychopath murders licentious teenagers in a Main Street America 
town. Reproducing this image may be a way for Patrick to give meaning to this body 
and, in so doing, to construct his identity by “citing” a well-known slasher film. He 
will be even less subtle in a later passage. 
 
The office Halloween party was at the Royalton last week 
and I went as a mass murderer, complete with a sign 
painted on my back that read MASS MURDERER (which 
was decidedly lighter than the sandwich board I had 
constructed earlier that day that read DRILLER KILLER), 
and beneath those two words I had written in blood Yep, 
that’s me and the suit was also covered with blood, some 
of it fake, most of it real. (330) 
 
In the end, Patrick chooses to represent a generic type rather than refer to the specific 
killer from Abel Ferrara’s film (1979) for fear the reference go unseen and his identity 
as a psychopath unrecognized, his colleagues not being familiar with serial killer 
culture so that they confuse the names of various killers, both real and fictitious 
(153). If his secret identity is supposed to set him apart from the other yuppies, who 
readily acknowledge that Patrick is “always bring[ging] them up” (153), this 
differentiation is compromised because the figure of transgression he constitutes 
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himself as is just borrowed from another set of pop culture texts. Patrick’s making 
the distinction between “fake” and “real” blood underlines the fact that this excerpt 
shows just the opposite, that is to say, for Patrick, “being” or “representing” a 
psychopath or a yuppie comes down to the same thing: the true self and the false, 
social or performing self are one and the same, or rather, there is no true self; 
identity, the self-affirming italics underline, is a discursive construct. 
 In the end, evisceration leads nowhere at the diegetic level, but it does not lead 
the reader anywhere either: it is not exhaustive but becomes, rather, exhausting. 
Signs, like blood and ink, just keep on flowing, so that even the end of the novel is 
“NOT AN EXIT.” (399) Reading American Psycho is no more cathartic than “being a 
psychopath” for Patrick. The reader, like the psychopath, has no choice but to get rid 
of the textual body and put it back on the shelf, just as the psychopath gets rid of 
bodies, storing them in another apartment in Hell’s Kitchen and “keep[ing] the men’s 
bodies separate from the women’s” (249) to preserve some order and coherence in 
his world. 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1See Winnicott’s “Distorsion du moi en fonction du vrai et du faux “self” (1960).” 
2 Patrick says he is “unexpectedly depressed that [he] started this.” (45) 
3 In Séminaire X : L’Angoisse, Lacan says the following: “la norme du désir et la loi sont une 
seule et même chose” (232). I would add the norm of dread as well. 
4 See Sonia Baelo Allué’s essay which explains the relationship between the serial killer and 
the serial consumer, the practises of the serial killer representing a sick allegory of consumer 
society. 
5 Clément Rosset soutient que “[l]’idée fondamentale du naturalisme est une mise à l’écart 
du rôle du hasard dans la genèse des existences : l’affirmation que rien ne saurait se produire 
sans quelque raison, et qu’en conséquence les existences indépendantes des causes 
introduites par le hasard ou l’artifice des hommes résultent d’un autre ordre de causes, qui 
est l’ordre des causes naturelles. On sait seulement que la nature est ce qui reste quand on a 
de toutes choses biffé les effets de l’artifice et du hasard : nul ne précise ce qui reste ainsi, 
mais il suffit, pour que se constitue l’idée de nature, qu’on tienne pour acquis qu’il y a 
quelque chose qui reste.” (20) 
6 Patrick describes the rat as vampiric, “hissing at [him], baring its sharp, yellow rat fangs” 
(309), while rats carry the plague in F. W. Murnau’s Nosferatu (1922). 
138 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Irigaray says  “Alors rappelons : que l’enfant sera le substitut du pénis, désiré par la femme à 
ce seul titre ; que l’envie d’un enfant du même sexe que le père, d’un même que lui, sera 
attribuée à la femme ; que l’homme gardera le monopole de l’activité dans le coït ; qu’il 
marquera de son nom propre le produit de la copulation ; que si la mère se doit de suffire aux 
soins du nourrisson, de satisfaire à ses besoins élémentaires, l’enfant sera introduit par le 
père, et par identification au père, aux valeurs les plus appréciables, les plus cotées ; que 
l’homme-père sera le garant des systèmes de représentations, des idéaux, des intérêts sociaux, de 
l’exercice de la loi; etc. Et que, si la femme reste la condition indispensable à la (re)production 
matérielle de l’enfant, elle sera, autant que faire se peut, soumise aux projets de l’homme 
quant à celle-ci.” (117) 
8 The dog’s name is Richard and Dick is short for Richard! 
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